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The United States Supreme Court has recently entered the
area of marriage control by holding that a Virginia anti-mis.-
cegination statute violated constitutionally-protected rights.
The author traces the meaning of this decision through the maze
of state regulatory systems, reaching some very unconventional
conclusions and proposals and illustrating the need for a total
rethinking of the role of the state in marriage regulations.
The implications of Loving v. Virginia,1 decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 12, 1967, may be far more important
than the actual result which the Court reached. In a unanimous
ruling the Court struck down laws in sixteen states which prohibit
marriage between members of different races, stating in effect that
any statutory restriction on the freedom of choice regarding a part-
ner in marriage must, in order to withstand the scrutiny of the
Constitution, rest on a reasonable medical or moral ground and fall
clearly within the state's competence to regulate the formation of
the marriage contract.
The facts of Loving and its record in the lower courts made the
Supreme Court's invalidation of all anti-miscegenation laws rela-
tively easy. The precise question before the Court involved the
marital union of Richard Perry Loving, a white man, and Mildred
Jeter, a part-Negro and part-Indian woman. Married validly in
the District of Columbia in June of 1958, the Lovings were ordered
by a court in Virginia to separate from each other or leave the State.
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for the Court, had no difficulty
vacating the felony conviction of the Lovings under Virginia law2
and categorizing the anti-miscegenation statute as a law based on
"invidious racial discrimination .. .designed to maintain White
Supremacy."$ The Chief Justice explained as the background for
the Court's decision that the "statutory scheme" rejected "dates from
the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the
period of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First
World War."4
In view of the undeniable racist motivation of Virginia's anti-
*Dean, Boston College of Law.
1 388 US. 1 (1967).
2 VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 20-57, 58 & 59 (1950).
3 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
4 Id. at 6.
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miscegenation law the Supreme Court did not really have to con-
front the question of the limits of the state's power to regulate the
freedom of choosing one's spouse; but the Court, in order to justify
its interdiction of governmental decrees restricting the right to
marry, felt obligated to delineate the nature of the marriage rela-
tion and the role of the state in regulating it. The fact that the
Loving case was the first occasion in American history for the Su-
preme Court to say anything about the countless laws in every state
regulating the formation of the marriage contract may have promp-
ted the Court to move beyond the finding of racism upon which
the decision was based.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia reasoned that
marriage is subject to state regulation.5 Chief Justice Warren con-
cedes that "the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that mar-
riage is a social relation subject to the State's police power";6 but
Warren goes on to note that the State of Virginia did "not contend
in its argument before this Court that its powers to regulate mar-
riage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the Four-
teenth Amendment".7 At a ]ater point in his opinion Chief Justice
Warren advances far beyond these bland conclusions and writes as
follows:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happi-
ness by free men.
Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' funda-
mental to our very existence and survival .... To deny this
fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so direct-
ly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citi-
zens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not
be restricted by indivious racial discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed
by the State."8
These statements about freedom of choice in marriage, taken
from the final two paragraphs of Chief Justice Warren's opinion,
are arbuably dicta. On the other hand, one can urge with equal or
better reason that they are an essential part of the Court's opinion.
5 Id. at 7.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 12.
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In any event the two paragraphs quoted are unprecedented in Su-
preme Court jurisprudence. For the first time in history the Court
has turned its attention to the questions of the "freedom to marry"
and the "freedom of choice" in selecting a marriage partner. The
Court has stated eloquently that both these freedoms are "vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men." Long after the actual result reached in the Loving decision
has become an obscure footnote in the tragic story of the American
Negro's struggle for legal equality, the ringing words of the Court
about freedom of choice in selecting a spouse will continue to have
an impact of enormous significance.
In order to appreciate the monumental importance of the pre-
suppositions suggested by the Court as some of the bases for its
decision it will be helpful to explore three topics: (1) The few
cases prior to Loving in which the Supreme Court touched on legal-
ly binding marriage requirements or restrictions; (2) The chaotic
state of existing statutory law on such subjects as affinity and con-
sanguinity as impediments to marriage, along with a review of state
laws related to mental and medical requirements for marriage;
(8) The norms which should guide the state in establishing statu-
tory prohibitions regulating the formation of the marriage contract.
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FREEDOM TO MARRY PRIOR TO
LOVING
In the cases9 of the last century in which the Supreme Court
refused to yield to the Mormons' requests, based on religious con-
victions, for an easing of the legal ban on polygamy, the Court said
surprisingly little about either the nature of the marriage contract
itself or the limits of the state's role in establishing minimum stand-
ards for the formation of the marriage contract. The decisions of
the Court with regard to plural marriages employ some strong rhetor-
ic to defend monogamy and to brand polygamy as "odious among
the northern and western nations of Europe."' 0 The Court more-
over tries to analogize polygamy to the custom of wives throwing
themselves on the funeral pyres of their husbands or to the making
of human sacrifices as a necessary part of religious worship. Such
emotion-laden phrases are hardly conducive to a critical analysis of
the nature of marriage.
The Reynolds opinion and the decisions which followed it al>
9 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); David v. Beason, 18 U.S. 833
(1890); Mormon Church v. United States, 186 U.S. 1 (1890).
10 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
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pear to beg the question at issue by assuming that bigamy is per se
disruptive of the social order and that the challenged statute requir-
ing monogamy is within the legislative power of Congress. The atti-
tude and language of the Supreme Court in the polygamy cases un-
doubtedly gave impetus to the Congress which in 1887 enacted leg-
islation providing for a judicial proceeding to terminate the cor-
porate charter of the Mormon Church and for the escheat of its
property. The resulting forfeitures were validated by a divided
Court in 1890.11
The Supreme Court made no reference in Loving to the poly-
gamy decisions. Nor, surprisingly, did the Court refer to its ruling
in Griswold v. Connecticut2 wherein it invalidated a Connecticut
law restricting the sale and use of contraceptives, employing as one
of its reasons the privacy and intimacy of marriage. The only three
cases concerned in any way with marriage which the Court cited in
Loving are so tangentially related to the issue of freedom of choice
in marriage that their very citation demonstrates dramatically that
the Court has never before ruled on any question raised by legal
restrictions on the right to marry.
The court's citation of Maynard v. Hill8 at two points in the
Loving opinion appears to be intended only for the purpose of con-
ceding the bland proposition that "marriage is a social relation sub-
ject to the State's police power."' 4 Maynard v. Hill is, of course, the
locus classicus for the oft-cited aphorism that "[m]arriage, as creat-
ing the most important relation in life, as having more to do with
the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution,
has always been subject to the control of the legislature".' 5 The
same opinion, while sustaining by a seven to two split a legislative
divorce granted to a husband without notice or knowledge on the
part of his wife, is redolent with piety about marriage which the
Court calls "the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress."' 6
The Court's reference to Meyer v. Nebraska,17 without specify-
ing any page of that opinion, is apparently intended to reaffirm the
position taken by the Meyer Court that the liberty guaranteed in
the fourteenth amendment denotes, among other things, "the right
31 Morman Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
12 381 US. 479 (1965).
'3 125 US. 190 (1888).
14 Loving v. Virginia, 388 US. 1, 7 (1967).
'5 125 US. 190, 205 (1888).
16 Id. at 211.
'.7 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occu-
pations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dic-
tates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men."' 8 (Emphasis supplied.) It would seem
that the emphasized words are dicta since they appear in a ruling
which invalidated a Nebraska statute prohibiting instruction in any
foreign language in both private and public schools to pupils below
the ninth grade level.
The Court's double reference in Loving to Skinner v. Okla-
homa' 9 is apparently an attempt to incorporate the eloquent lang-
uage of that decision, which reversed a criminal conviction and a
penalty of compulsory sterilization, wherein Mr. Justice Douglas
speaking for the Court stated that "[w]e are here dealing with legis-
lation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race. ' 20 It is significant to note, however, that the Court's
opinion in Skinner did not overrule its earlier decision in Buck v.
Bell2' which permitted involuntary sterilization on eugenic grounds.
Indeed Chief Justice Stone, concurring separately in Skinner pre-
sumably did not contradict the rest of the Skinner opinion when
he wrote that "[u]ndoubtedly a state may, after appropriate inquiry,
constitutionally interfere with the personal liberty of the individual
to prevent the transmission by inheritance of his socially injurious
tendencies. ' 22 This statement, if still acceptable to a majority of the
Court, would obviously have enormous consequences for an age
which has witnessed an explosion in mankind's knowledge and con-
trol of genetics. One may question whether this sweeping statement
by Chief Justice Stone can be reconciled with other dicta in the
Meyer and Loving opinions. Raising this question demonstrates
once again that the Supreme Court was on an uncharted sea when
in Loving it undertook, for the first time in history, to rule on the
constitutionality of restrictions on a citizen's freedom to marry the
person of his choice.
The Court in Loving made reference, of course, to its own
previous holding in a miscegenation case, McLaughlin v. Florida.2 8
18 Id. at 899.
'9 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
20 Id. at 541.
21 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
22 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942).
23 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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But the carefully qualified opinion in that case, severely restricted
to the equal protection argument, categorically stated that the Court
invalidated the relevant Florida law "without expressing any views
about the State's prohibition of interracial marriage." 24
Although the Supreme Court made no reference in Loving to
Griswold v. Connecticut,25 a description of marriage contained in
Griswold may be significant because it adds to the notion of mar-
riage as a civil contract, status or relationship (concepts employed
by the Court in previous decisions) the idea of marriage as a con-
stitutionally-protected "association." Writing for a seven to two
majority Mr. Justice Douglas ventured a definition of marriage in
the following terms:
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose
as any involved in our prior decisions.20
Although actual references in Supreme Court decisions as to the
exact legal nature of marriage are rare, one could argue that the
Court has to some extent adopted a philosophy of marriage in its
numerous decisions about domicile and divorce in the line of cases
from Haddock v. Haddock27 to Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.2S These de-
cisions, while not expressly concerned with the freedom to marry or
with freedom of choice in selecting a spouse, reflect a jurisprudence
of marriage whose radiations may be of great significance if Loving
establishes a series of cases which seek to vindicate the newly-pro-
tected freedom to niarry the person of one's choice.
As one ponders the enormous implications of the guarantee
established in Loving, he is amazed that the Supreme Court in all
of American history has not dealt with this question prior to 1967.
Several reasons can be advanced for this phenomenon, the least de-
batable of which is the presence in American society and law of a
remarkable symbiosis between widely-held sacred and secular views
on marriage. Unlike America's law on divorce, which reflects little
consensus and great confusion, America's law on the formation of
the marriage contract reflects the nation's conviction and faith that
marriages are born of love, that they are made in Heaven and that
24 Id. at 196.
25 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26 Id. at 486.
27 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
28 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
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the law should at most issue a license and record the date of the
happy event.
An example of this faith can be seen in the anomalous arrange-
ment by which clergymen of all kinds may perform marriages along
with justices of the peace. Statutes written over a century ago con-
ferring the right to perform marriages on a vast number of public
and denominational officials have survived into a vastly different
age unchallenged by anyone as violations of the no-establishment-
of-religion clause of the first amendment or even as dreadfully
drafted and incomprehensible laws. At least one of the reasons that
these statutes survive unexamined and unchallenged is the convic-
tion of American society that the freedom to marry the person of
one's choice is a right so basic that no law should restrict it or even
delay its fulfillment.
The freedom to marry can be restricted by the law either
through incentives or inhibitions. The law would restrict or nar-
row a person's freedom to marry by offering an incentive to marry
if, for example, a statute making seduction a crime specified that
the inter-marriage of the parties would be a complete defense to
the charge of criminal conduct. Such an incentive to marry would
surely in certain circumstances diminish the limits of the freedom
to marry.
The type of restriction on the freedom to marry which is more
usually thought of, however, is not an incentive to marriage but
rather an inhibition on the formation of a marriage contract. Such
inhibitions result from laws specifying the minimum age required
for persons entering marriage, the degrees of affinity and consanguin-
ity within which marriage is forbidden, the necessity for parental
consent for minors and the waiting period required after a divorce
before entering into a new marriage.
Decisional law in America challenging statutory inhibitions on
the freedom to marry is very sparse. Until the Loving decision there
was little if any speculation about the possibility that the four-
teenth amendment might guarantee the freedom to marry. Whether
Loving will stimulate litigation regarding challenges to the count-
less legal restrictions on the freedom to marry remains to be seen;
however, it is indisputably clear from Loving that lawyers and law-
makers have a responsibility to reform the maze of incomprehensible
and contradictory laws which restrict the freedom to marry.
II. STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREEDOM TO MARRY
The freedom to marry cannot in modern society be successfully
separated from the freedom to marry the person of one's choice.
(Vol. 29
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For modem man, freedom to marry must be synonymous with the
right to marry the person one chooses. Any significant factor which
places a restraint on this freedom is open to question in the light
of Loving. Any phenomenon which either induces or inhibits a
marriage can be said to be a restraint on the freedom to marry in
that such a phenomenon either adds an incentive to marriage which
limits the freedom of choice or it narrows the class of individuals
available for marriage. It would seem, therefore, that laws which
shrink the area of choice in selecting a partner for marriage will
be held constitutional only when based on some reasonable medical
or moral evidence and intended to regulate some aspect of mar-
riage which is within the police power of the state.
A. Laws Which Induce Marriages
Laws concerned with seduction, illegitimacy, fornication and
bastardy may sometimes tend to induce marriage. Let us examine
the impact of these laws in the light of Loving.
Thirty-six states make seduction a crime.20 In more than thirty
of these states marriage or an agreement to marry the seducee is a
perfect defense for the man accused of seduction. The civil side of
seduction, the suit to recover "heart-balm" for the breach of the
promise to marry, was abolished on a widespread basis a generation
ago.30 Legislators who repealed laws conferring a right to recover
for a broken engagement reasoned that the breach of the relation-
ship between a man and a woman who have agreed to marry each
other should not be made the basis of a compensable tort; but
curiously this reasoning did not lead to the repeal of laws which
made a criminal of the man who promised a girl that he would
marry her and on this basis persuaded her to have pre-marital re-
lations.
No one can say with any degree of accuracy how many mar-
riages are hastened or induced by the threat of the use of the crim-
inal sanctions of seduction statutes. If there is a case for retaining
any criminal penalties for seduction, the modified form of this crime
proposed in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute
is perhaps a desirable protection of whatever interest the state has
to safeguard in this area. The A.L.I. Code provides that:
29 For a list of the jurisdictions and the relevant statutes see Wadlington, Shot-
gun Marriage by Operation of Law, 1 GA. L. REv. 183 (1967).
30 1 F. HARPER & F. JAm, THE LAw oF Tor 628-29 (1956). For a discussion oE
these statutes see Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 Mica. L. REV.
979, 987-88 (1935).
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A male who has intercourse with a female not his wife . . is
guilty of an offense if... the other person is a female who is
induced to participate by a promise of marriage which the actor
does not mean to perform.8'
This proposed statute does not make marriage a defense and is de-
signed, as the commentary notes, to reach the "case of the Lothario
who may be deceiving a series of girls with false promises of mar-
riage." 32
The usefulness of the Model Penal Code's proposal is open to
question, but at least it does not infringe on the freedom to marry,
as d6 existing statutes which practically precipitate marriages by mak-
ing marriage a perfect defense to a charge of seduction. The consti-
tutionality of statutes which so provide is open to serious doubt in
view of the words of Chief Justice Warren in Loving that "[t]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."38
1. Illegitimacy Statutes
Every sixteenth child born in the United States is illegitimate. 84
Although an increasing number of states permit the natural father
of a child born out of wedlock to recognize and legitimate the child
without the requirement of marriage to the mother, the fact is that
in virtually all states except Arizona and Oregon some disadvantage
devolves on the child born outside a marriage.85 There is therefore a
strong inducement to marry when a man and a woman have con-
ceived a child out of wedlock. The ancient justification for a mar-
riage, "to give the child a name," may not accurately reflect the laws
of a state which has liberalized its statutes on the rights of illegiti-
mate children, but the adage remains a potentially powerful and
compelling restriction upon a man and a woman with respect to
their freedom of choice in marriage. Since the marriage of the par-
ents of a child born outside wedlock is not necessary for the state
31 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 (1) and (1) (d) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962),
82 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207A, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
33 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
34 Krause, The Non-Marital Child - New Conceptions For the Law of Unlawful.
ness, 1 FAm. LAW. Q. 1 (June 1967). For a complete review of the law and illegit.
mates in America see Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. Rtmv
477 (1967).
35 Arizona and Oregon have enacted laws which provide for the legal cquality
of legitimate and illegitimate children. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate,
65 MIcH. L. REv. 477 (1967).
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to confer upon such child all the benefits received by a legitimate
child, a legal arrangement which induces marriages as a device to
make a child legitimate is clearly contrary to the thrust of Loving.
2. Fornication Statutes
Virtually nothing is known about what influence, if any, the
laws which make fornication a crime in some thirty-five states have
on anyone's freedom to marry. This absence of knowledge undoubt-
edly derives in large part from the non-enforcement of these laws.
But statutes penalizing fornication, when fortified by, or thought
to be fortified by, laws related to seduction, statutory rape and bas-
tardy, may induce a marriage because of the shame or fear of per-
sons accused or about to be accused of a crime.
Consensual conduct of this nature between two persons does
not seem to represent an interest which the state by its criminal law
should protect. Fornication and adultery have never been criminal
acts in England.
Legislation which makes adultery a crime presumably protects
the interest of the injured spouse; but the extension of criminal law
to the act of adultery cuts many ways. With respect to the freedom
to marry, criminal laws against adultery operate to some extent like
the seduction and fornication laws in that they tend to make the
male party involved a likely object of blackmail and cause pressure
on him to divorce and re-marry. At the same time criminal sanc-
tions against adultery tend to weaken the position of a wife in-
volved in such conduct and may, rightly or wrongly, raise a legal
question of her moral suitability as a custodian for her children.
3. Bastardy and Paternity Statutes
There are several good reasons why the crime of bastardy or
"begetting with child," as some statutes put it, should be abolished.
The deterrent effect of these laws is highly doubtful and certainly
not provable. The gravamen of the crime is presumably the harm
done to the "bastard" rather than to the unwed mother. It is sub-
mitted that a civil action of paternity - with the availability of
sanctions of criminal contempt for non-payment - sufficiently pro-
tects the interest of the state and of the child in this area.
The unavoidable thrust of a criminal statute for bastardy is to
constrict the freedom of choice in marriage of the parties involved.
A civil suit of paternity initiated by the unwed mother, but imple-
mented in fact by the court, would if properly arranged tend to
teach the couple involved that marriage is not necessarily advisable
but that suitable support for the child is the appropriate remedy
1968]
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for the harm done.
Paternity statutes can sometimes have the same impact as bas-
tardy laws if it is made clear to the unmarried father that he is
liable for the support of the child until the child's eighteenth birth-
day. Although the almost total non-enforcement of these statutory
requirements enunciated in the laws of most states is common
knowledge in the literature about public assistance laws, such knowl-
edge is not likely to come to the attention of an unmarried father
to whom marriage might well appear less unsatisfactory than con-
fronting a period of eighteen years during which he would be ob-
liged to support a child fathered out of wedlock.
The foregoing represent the clear and generally unmistakable
legal inducements to marry. To the extent that they restrict the
freedom of choice in selecting a spouse they impinge on the newly-
guaranteed freedom to marry.
If one views the inducements to marry contained by implica-
tion in statutes penalizing pre-marital behavior as relatively unim-
portant and only dubiously influential on the choice of those per-
sons involved, these potential statutory invitations to marry should
be re-examined in light of the powerful forces which have brought
about the fact that forty percent of all American brides today are
between the ages of fifteen and eighteen.8 0 The statutory encour-
agements to marriage noted above are also relevant to a considera-
tion of the fact that the median age for marriage is at the lowest
point in American history and that in urban areas a whole sub-
culture of teenage marriage and divorce has developed. 87
In surveying the countless legal and non-legal inducements to
marry that operate in American culture one is almost instinctively
inclined to desire some developments which will slow down the
process of easy and early marriages. Most of the less-sophisticated
writing about marriage and divorce in America urges the adoption
of a restrictive approach by the law in the processes which it re-
quires of those who desire to marry. The remedies proposed, such
as a longer waiting period, mandatory pre-marital instruction, and
counselling, might be useful in certain cases, but the impact of all
laws regulating the conduct of persons desiring to marry is at best
speculative. There will probably be more and more attempts made
in the near future by civic groups and by legislatures to impose
30 Preface to TEENAGE MARRIAGE AND DIvoRCE (S. Farber & R. Wilson cd. 1967).
87 Bohannan, The Natural History of the Divorced Teen.Ager, and Furlong,




restrictions, or at least postponements, on young couples who de-
sire to marry. These restrictions will be justified on the basis that
the law should favor the stability of marriage, an institution which,
in the wistful words of Mr. Justice Douglas, is "coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring." (Emphasis supplied.) 8
The desire that marriages be "hopefully enduring" would seem to
offer some justification for the imposition of restrictions designed
to assist marriages in attaining that quality of endurance; but such
restrictions, however well-intentioned, must now pass muster in
the light of the freedom to marry guaranteed by Loving. Taken
literally the freedom of choice protected in Loving would seem to
take priority over any restriction imposed by the state designed to
promote the "hopefully abiding" quality of a marital union. Any
such restriction to be constitutional must at least have a rational
objective and must be within an area in which the state has a legiti-
mate interest. Under this test many of the existing statutory re-
strictions on marriage are open to serious question.
B. Restrictions on. the Freedom to Marry
Restrictions imposed by law on the freedom to marry fall into
the following categories: (1) restrictions based on affinity or con-
sanguinity precluding whole classes of persons from inter-marrying;
(2) restrictions based on the presumed incompetency of one of the
parties to a marriage such as the lack of mental competence; (3)
restrictions based on the opposition of the parents of minor children;
(4) restrictions based on a policy requiring a mandatory waiting
period of six months or a year before a divorced person may re-
marry.
To discern the underlying rationale behind these various classes
of restrictions is not easy and perhaps not really possible. In most
instances neither the wording of a statute nor its legislative or ju-
dicial history reveal its ultimate intended purpose. In the absence
of any discernible and defensible public policy behind such re-
strictions the presumption arises that the freedom to marry cannot
be thus constricted. This is not to say, however, that the freedom
to marry is a privilege which cannot be delimited by the state for
clearly stated and legitimate reasons; but the state in exercising its
role to circumscribe the freedom to marry must limit its power to
those few areas where it can forbid (not merely postpone). One in-
stance of a legitimate exercise of this power would be the case where
a spouse might communicate a serious infectious disease to his mari-
38 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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tal partner or to a child of the marriage.
With this suggested norm in mind let us review the categories
of restrictions on marriage as noted above.
1. Consanguinity
Statutes prohibiting marriages on the basis of consanguinity
(see Appendix A) consistently ban all marriages in the direct lineal
line. Some thirty jurisdictions extend this ban to first cousins, while
one state (Rhode Island) withdraws its prohibitions in the case of
members of the Jewish faith and allows them to marry according
to their own religious views on consanguinity and affinity.
The ban on marriages between persons related by consanguin-
ity is presumably grounded on medical evidence that the offspring
of such unions tend to be genetically inferior. This evidence has
been questioned,8 9 but there appears to be no trend or tendency
to ease the statutory prohibitions on marriage between blood rela-
tives which exist in every state. Indeed these provisions of the mar-
riage law are reinforced by statutes on incest which not infrequently
carry Draconian penalties.
One obvious way to mitigate the inflexible severity of laws
prohibiting marriages between blood relatives would be to provide
legal machinery to decide upon applications for exemption from
the statute. Ecclesiastical courts, as for example in the Catholic
Church, will upon request provide for exemption from canon law
for the marriage of first cousins. A similar procedure should be
available in state courts, especially in cases where a child of a mar-
riage between persons related by consanguinity is unlikely or im-
possible. The need for a judicial exempting device is particularly
urgent where the state forbids a marriage which is allowed by an
individual's church, a clear case of state restriction on the free ex-
ercise of religion as well as on the freedom to marry a person of
one's choice.
2. Affinity Statutes
It seems impossible to find any rationale for the laws in twenty
states and the District of Columbia (see Appendix B) which forbid
marriage between persons related by affinity, that is, by a relation-
ship based exclusively on marriage. Presumably these laws were en-
acted to diminish those intra-family tensions which might arise if
persons related by affinity within a family circle were free to marry
80 For references to the scientific evidence see Moore, A Defense of First.
Cousin Marriage, 10 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 136 (1961).
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each other after the death or divorce of the spouse of the person
sought as a marriage partner. It seems clear that, even if impedi-
ments predicated on affinity might have been useful in a previous
age when all the members of a family lived within a closed com-
munity, statutory restrictions upon the marriage of in-laws appear
simply incongruous in today's society.
An inspection of the statutes on affinity reveals the frequent
use of ambiguous term "step" to describe a relationship between
individuals. In the Connecticut statute, for example, a man may
not marry his "stepdaughter." The commonly accepted understand-
ing of the term "stepdaughter" would be to designate the non-
adopted daughter of a man's wife. The unprecedented high number
of such "stepdaughters" because of frequent re-marriage after di-
vorce in contemporary society is a phenomenon which makes sta-
tutes banning marriages between persons related by affinity more
far-reaching than one would at first imagine.
The twenty states which make affinity a barrier to marriage
are almost exclusively in the northeastern and southern parts of the
nation. It may be, therefore, that only the older states of the union,
and thus those more likely to reflect a sectarian influence in their
law, have statutes on affinity as a bar to marriage. If religious groups
or denominational leaders had any rationale for prohibiting mar-
riages between persons related by affinity, it was not made visible
in the laws of that score of states which enacted non-waivable im-
pediments to marriage between persons affiliated by affinity. 40
One of the unfortunate and distressing features of the laws
which preclude marriage on the basis of affinity is the frequent
declaration that such marriages shall be "incestuous" or "void."
In Iowa, for example, the man who, through an oversight of a clerk
issuing a marriage license, is allowed to marry his son's widow en-
ters a marriage which the statute states "shall be void."4' 1 Most of
the statutes moreover make no provision for an in-state validation
of a marriage contracted elsewhere but declared "void" in the state
where, for example, one of the parties to the marriage dies. The
surviving spouse to such a marriage may well be faced with litiga-
tion if the prospective heirs of an intestate decedent seek to prove
that the decedent's wife is not his widow because her marriage was
void.
40 For an explanation of the origin of affinity as an impediment to marriage and
a cogent argument against its continuation see Proposed Marriage and Divorce Codes
for Pennsylvania, PA. GLNq. ASSEMBLY, JOINT STATE GoV'T Cot'N, 18-21 (1961).
41 IOWA CODE AN. tit. 28 § 595.19 (West 1950).
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No "parade of the horribles" is needed to demonstrate that
the twenty states with laws on affinity and marriage are perpetuat-
ing regulations which, however infrequently they may be enforced,
are nonetheless indefensible restraints on the freedom of choice in
marriage.
3. Mental and Physical Disqualifications to Marriage
Thirty-four states and Puerto Rico (see Appendix C) impose
impediments to marriage based on insanity, feeblemindedness or re-
lated disabilities of one of the parties. The first question which
must be asked about these statutes is whether they have upon mar-
riage any effect absent in the sixteen states which have no statutes
specifying physical or mental disqualifications for marriage. If it
were demonstrated that the thirty-four states which seek by law to
prevent incompetent persons from contracting marriage are unable
or unwilling to achieve this objective under their existing statutes,
one could merely advocate the repeal of these useless laws and would
not have to be concerned about the restrictions on the freedom to
marry which these laws impose. But in the nature of things it seems
fair to assume that in all probability laws which forbid the issuance
of marriage licenses to whole classes of individuals categorized in
such unscientific terms as persons "of unsound mind," "habitual
drunkards," "confirmed users of narcotic drugs" or "mental re-
tardates" operate to the detriment of the poor and the disadvant-
aged. Such laws probably have little, if any, effect on white, middle-
class applicants for a marriage license. Aside from this suspected
discrimination, however, the statutes are so incredibly incompre-
hensible that, even if they made available a hearing to parties ad-
versely affected (which they do not), it would be almost impossible
in most cases to represent a person refused a license, since the sta-
tutes fail to furnish any clear guidelines as to the exact nature of
the disabilities for which a marriage license may be denied.
Several features of the laws preventing the marriage of persons
with various afflictions would seem to raise fundamental constitu-
tional problems. The requirement, for example, in Nebraska and
North Carolina, among other states, that a person of unsound mind
must be sterilized before he can obtain a license to marry is surely
unjust. Such a law erroneously assumes that certain forms of mental
disease are transmitted by heredity and that the state has the right
and duty to prevent the procreation of persons affected by such a
disease.
Six states, curiously enough, have legislated against granting
licenses to marry to persons under the influence of mind-expanding
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drugs! Oregon requires that every person acquire a statement from
a physician that the applicant "is free from... drug addiction or
chronic alcoholism." Delaware law makes "void" any marriage con-
tracted by a "confirmed user of a narcotic drug," while California,
Ohio, Illinois and New Jersey direct the clerk of the marriage
bureau to refuse a license to anyone who is under the influence of a
"narcotic drug."
Other curiosities abound. In Delaware a "marriage between
paupers is prohibited," while in Vermont a "town pauper" may not
marry" without the written consent of the selectman or overseer
of the poor .... I" A few states still restrict the right of an epileptic
to marry, although tuberculosis as an impediment has all but dis-
appeared.
The best that one can say about the laws in the thirty-four
states which prevent the marriage of persons allegedly incompetent
to form the contract of marriage is that they are the institutionaliza-
tion of myths about mental illness and its transmission by a former
generation.
Paradoxically the condition which furnishes the most cogent
justification for forbidding a marriage - the presence of infectious
venereal disease - is not usually written into the laws of those
thirty-four jurisdictions which have established minimum standards
of health required of those who apply for a license to marry. Ap-
parently all states require a serological test, but a marriage license
may be issued even if the test reveals the existence of a communi-
cable venereal disease. How often the marriage of a person with
such a disease occurs cannot be known, but the failure to tie in the
medical test with marriage licensing statutes is another manifesta-
tion of the apathy and ignorance of legislators with respect to laws
regulating the formation of the marriage contract.
4. Restrictions Based on the Opposition
of the Parents of Minors
Legal impediments to the marriage of under-aged youths and
to recently divorced adults are technically not prohibitions of mar-
riage, but only postponements. Nonetheless these restrictions inter-
fere with an individual's freedom to marry, which, like other con-
stitutionally protected guarantees, may not be repressed by law for
any notable period of time without a justification that is propor-
tionate to the liberty restrained.
Laws requiring the consent of parents to the marriage of minors
appear on first sight to provide an eminently reasonable means of
furnishing guidance to non-age youths as well as assisting parents
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to protect their children from ill-advised marriages. Further analy-
sis of these laws raise the most fundamental questions about their
wisdom and, to a lesser extent, about their constitutionality.
One remedy for problems associated with the marriage of mi-
nors without parental consent would be to require only that a par-
ent know of the marriage before it takes place, but not that he con-
sent to it. Requiring as a condition precedent to the issuance of a
marriage license that a parent be informed of the intended mar-
riage of a child in the eighteen to twenty-one year old group would
give the parent and the minor an opportunity for discussion of the
advisability of the marriage sought by the underage child. If the
parent after exploring all aspects of the matter with his child is
still opposed to the marriage, he has a questionable right at best to
have the coercive force of the law prevent the marriage of his son or
daughter.
The law itself appears unsure of the extent to which it should
enforce parental opposition, since the law does not void the mar-
riage contracted without parental consent but only makes it void-
able. If the right to void the non-age marriage rests with one of the
spouses, the right of the parent to withhold consent to the marriage
is a right that is not particularly meaningful. If, on the other hand,
parents have the right to obtain an annulment of an underage mar-
riage, the erosion of the freedom to marry is clear. In 1931, Vernier,
in his compilation of statutes on marriage, reported fourteen states
which permit a parent to bring such an action.4 2 The inconsistency
of these laws with the thrust of the Loving decision need not be
elaborated.
The Proposed Marriage Code for Pennsylvania 48 would con-
tinue the requirement of parental consent for marriage by minors,
but with judicial authorization to issue a license if "it is in the
best interest of the applicant." The same Code, however, would
make meaningful the right of the parent to object by permitting
him to petition for an annulment within sixty days after the un-
authorized marriage. 44 This proposal, designed to preserve the rights
of parents for sixty days after the marriage of their child, may have
merit, but one hesitates to think about what such a threat of inter-
ference might do to an otherwise viable marriage during its first
sixty days of existence.
42 1 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 251 (1931); Annot., 150 ALR. 609
(1944).
43 Proposed Marriage and Divorce Codes for Pennsylvania, PA. GEN. A5sIstLY,
JOINT STATE Gov'r Commli'N (1961).
44 Id. § 207 (c).
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5. Restrictions on the Remarriage of Divorced Persons
Although only about ten states have interlocutory decrees of
divorce, which keep the marriage in existence until a designated
amount of time has elapsed after the granting of the decree, a sub-
stantial number of states withhold from divorced persons the right
to remarry for periods up to a year. The extensive and dreary de-
cisional law about the many legal issues which these laws raise"
seldom, if ever, reaches the question of what justification, if any,
the state can offer for enforcing celibacy for a specified time.
The statutes in this area, like most laws regulating pre-marital
conduct, contain elements of fantasy and cruelty. The Virginia
Code40 provides that in "granting a divorce for adultery, the court
may decree that the guilty party shall not marry again at any time"!
But the same section allows the judge who decreed perpetual celi-
bacy to revoke it "for good cause shown... after the expiration
of six months." The Iowa Code47 wistfully reminds ex-spouses that,
during the year of their post-divorce celibacy, nothing in the law
"shall prevent the persons divorced from remarrying each other."
Some few statutes, like the Virginia law cited above, place an
extra penalty on the "guilty" party, but all mandatory postpone-
ments of marriage appear to be grounded to some extent in the
fault theory of divorce. There appears to be something punitive
in the imposition of celibacy although there is also some evidence
that these statutes are designed only to provide a "cooling-off period"
after a divorce is granted.
If a statute grants a divorce decree which is final but prohibits
the parties from remarrying, without any legal machinery for an
exemption, the potential conflict with Loving is clear. Such a con-
flict is even more severe if the divorce is granted on a non-fault
ground such as insanity and the spouse is still prohibited from re-
marrying.
Little if any empirical data exists on the impact of laws im-
posing temporary celibacy on recently divorced persons; however,
even if a reliable analysis demonstrated that these laws had a sta-
bilizing influence on the affected ex-spouses and their children, the
fundamental question would remain: can the state prohibit, even
for a time, competent single persons from entering into marriage
45 For a discussion of remarriage after interlocutory decree, remarriage in viola-
tion of prohibitory statutes and their out-of-state consequences see Kingsley, Re-
marriage After Divorce, 26 S. CAL. L. Ray. 280 (1953).
46 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-119 (1950).
47 IowA CODE ANN. tit. 28 § 598.17 (West 1950).
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with a person of their choice? The answer to that question may be
contained in the words of Chief Justice Warren who wrote in Loving
that "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. 48
III. NORMS FOR LEGAL REGULATION OF THE FORMATION OF TIUE
MARRIAGE CONTRACT
Any attempt to fashion satisfactory guidelines for regulating
the substance and form of pre-marriage law must begin with a can-
did and clear statement regarding what role, if any, the government
should play in establishing the minimum standards required for a
marriage.
The ultimate purpose of pre-marriage regulations should be
to strike a balance between a policy which maximizes the freedom
to marry, with an attempt to discourage irresponsible persons from
-contracting marriage. The latter objective has, up to Loving, con-
"stituted almost the only purpose behind the vast array of statutes
specifying which persons may marry and when. At the same time
these statutes on .pre-marital behavior have been allowed to go
unenforced, to be evaded without difficulty and to become substan-
tially archaic. Such developments indicate that the public policy
behind these laws is, or has become, ambiguous and that virtually
no judicial official with jurisdiction over these matters is able or
willing to enforce them.
Loving suggests, but does not make entirely clear, that any
statutory restraint on the freedom to marry must be predicated on
potential harm to the offspring of the marriage or on some clear and
grave moral or medical justification.
In proposing norms for a complete rethinking of American
pre-marriage law one is obliged to enter an almost completely un-
charted field, Consequently whatever one proposes is likely to be
startling, unprecedented and, of course, untried. But the whole
area is so bewildering and the challenge of Loving so unmistakable
that some few guidelines should be attempted. The following ob-
servations therefore may be relevant:
First, it is somewhat curious that the law requires the issuance
of a marriage license rather than the mere registration of a mar-
riage. It is submitted that a registration statute and not a license
law would be appropriate and desirable. A state-issued license is
suitable for such activities as the possession of a gun and the right
48 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
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to drive a car; but for the exercise of one of the most fundamental
of all human rights, the right to be married, the state should not
imply (even by careless statutory language) that the right to marry
depends on a government-issued "license." The unhappy selection
of the term "marriage license" may in fact be one of the many rea-
sons why America has devised neither a useful and comprehensive
national standard governing the issuance of marriage licenses nor
any systematic nationalized way by which orderly information about
marriages may be registered and retrieved when occasion requires.
The suggested marriage registration act would operate on the
premise that any person who files a marriage registration form has
an inherent right to marry and that the state could not impede the
proposed marriage unless a substantial disqualification for regisrta-
tion appeared in the form. In such an event the marriage registra-
tion act would not automatically forbid a marriage but would di-
rect the applicants to the appropriate official empowered to grant a
variance.
A marriage registration act might have the effect of eliminating
common law or non-cerem6nial marriage, an arrangement which is
still permissible in some fifteen states. Clearly, persons married in
a consensual way would be a good deal less resistant to a form of
registration than that with which such couples now look on the pos-
sibility of securing a marriage license and going through a cere-
mony of marriage.
A system of marriage registration rather than a marriage licens-
ing arrangement might also lead to the adoption of standardized
forms throughout the nation and the gradual transference of the
function of registering marriages from the local township level
where it now rests to a state-wide bureau.
Second, it seems desirable that statutes regulating the forma-
tion of a marriage contract should make it clear that a marriage
must be valid or void and cannot be voidable. The whole jungle
,of statutory and decisional law about the voidability of marriages
grew up as a result of the lack of any state agency empowered to
dispense with a particular impediment affecting applicants for a
marriage license. Ecclesiastical courts and most nations of the earth
have a set of qualifications for marriage which, if not dispensed or
complied with, will render the marriage void.
The least that American law can do is to provide legislative
criteria for marriage with a built-in, easily accessible method of ob-
tamining a dispensation. Such criteria would furnish a norm by
which a marriage is automatically and by operation of law either
valid or void.
1968]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Third, the rights of children and minors may well be a sub-
ject which, partly as a result of the decision of In re Gault,4? will
soon be receiving unprecedented attention in judicial opinions, The
issue of the rights of students to due process in proceedings, in which
they may be adversely affected is a familiar example of one of the
several areas in which the rights of minors are in controversy. Other
areas include the rights of the children of divorce, the rights of re-
tarded children who are institutionalized and the rights of children
in foster homes.5 0
It seems inevitable that the creative thinking about the rights
of persons under the age of twenty-one will turn to the question of
their right to contract a marriage with a person of their choice and
at a time they prefer. Whether Loving will be the first decision in a
long line of cases like the series of decisions, for example, which
followed Baker v. Carr51 is a speculative question; but clearly Loving
strikes a blow for freedom in such a way as to make it unlikely that
the countless arbitrary statutory restrictions on the right to marry
can escape judicial testing.
It is possible that the surge of opinion in favor of guaranteeing
more rights to children and minors, when combined in a test case
with the full impact of Loving, may bring about a judicial opinion
which by implication will undermine almost every statutory restric-
tion on the freedom to marry. Those who desire to have a reason-
able framework of statutory guidelines for the regulation of the
marriages of minors and of other groups deemed to be in need of
some protection should rewrite existing laws in this area forthwith
or face the distinct possibility of the Supreme Court enunciating
principles which would make virtually all laws regarding formation
of the marriage relationship of dubious constitutionality, This leads
to a final question: what ultimate norms should the state seek in
rethinking its entire role in the area of marriage law?
Fourth, the revolution which occurred in England in 1857
when the English Parliament transferred jurisdiction over mar-
riage and divorce from the ecclesiastical courts to the civil tribunals
took place in America around the same time, without any apparent
resistance and without even the realization that such a transfer was
in fact a revolution. England and America might conceivably have
resisted countless secularizing forces and, like Israel, have left all
49 S87 U.S. 1 (1967).
50 Children in the Courts-The Question of Representation, UNIV. or Mici.
INSTI-UE OF CONMNUING LEGAL EDUCATION (1967).
51 369 U.S. 186 (1967).
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matters of marriage and divorce exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the rabbinical and ecclesiastical courts.
Despite the abdication or the invasion of the ecclesiastical
courts by an American civil law of marriage and divorce more than
a century ago, the American law of marriage continues to employ
legal concepts and judicial procedures which had their origin in
canon law and ecclesiastical tribunals. These concepts and proced-
ures now lack the underlying rationale upon which they were based
in a society which viewed marriage and divorce as belonging not
to Caesar, but to God. It is not surprising therefore that these con-
cepts and procedures, however familiar and indispensable they may
seem to be, actually do not and cannot reflect the reality or regulate
the substance of modem marriage and divorce.
There are several points of departure for those who would be-
gin to write a new law of marriage for the citizens of a free society.
One can think eugenically and propose that the purpose of mar-
riage laws should be the prevention of the birth of defective or re-
tarded persons. With the explosion of knowledge in the field of
genetics such a goal will very shortly be to some extent realizable.
Another approach to marriage law would start with the premise
that the law should help individuals, and especially young persons,
to resist those impetuous and importunate inclinations which if
followed will predictably lead to ill-fated marriages. If one begins
with this objective as his ultimate aim, any number of mandatory
barriers to marriage can be justified. If on the other hand one feels
that marriage law should place its prime emphasis on the rights of
the existing or potential children of a marriage, one must logically
advocate measures either to stabilize families by making marriage
and divorce more difficult or, in the alternative, to increase the
availability of judicial procedures for removing children from sit-
nations where their rights are not being observed.
None of these theories or any combination of them will pro-
duce a jurisprudence for modern marriage which will be satisfactory
to any significant element of American society. This fact is of course
not surprising in an increasingly pluralistic society in which there
is little consensus on even the most fundamental moral and spiritual
values. Given such diversity and pluralism the soundest premise
upon which marriage law can rest is the determination to maximize
the freedom to marry by eliminating all restraints on this freedom
upon which no substantial consensus of responsible opinion exists.
However inadequate such an approach may appear to many indi-
viduals, it is the historic mandate clearly implied in the case of
Loving v. Virginia.
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NEVADA X X X X1O




NORTH CAROLINA X15 X16
NORTH DAKOTA X3,4,5 X
OHIO X X X XlO
OKLAHOMA X2,6 X




SOUTH DAKOTA X2,5,6 X
TENNESSEE X3,7
TEXAS X11




WASHINGTON X X X XiO
WEST VIRGINIA X2 X16
WISCONSIN X3 X X XiO,19
WYOMING X2,5 X
* See notes to Appendix A at 382.
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NOTES TO CONSANGUINITY CHART (APPENDIX A)
1. Statute is confined to prohibiting males from marrying the specified
female relations and is expressly reciprocal in application.
2. Law specifically applies to half-brother and half-sister.
3. Law applies to all relations of the half-blood.
4. Law prohibits marriage between "grandparents and grandchildren
of every degree".
5. Law extends to illegitimate relations.
6. Law prohibits marriage between "ancestors and descendants" of
every degree.
7. Law prohibits marriage between a person and his ancestor or
descendant.
8. Law prohibits marriage to persons related by lineal consanguinity.
9. Law prohibits marriage within the Levitical degrees of consan-
guinity.
10. Law prohibits marriage between persons nearer of kin than second
cousins (thus prohibiting marriage to great-grandaunt and great-
grandniece).
11. Law does not specifically prohibit marriage to grandparent.
12. Law prohibits marriage between persons related to each other in
the direct ascending or descending line.
13. Law prohibits marriage of the father to his "legally adopted daugh-
ter".
14. The statute does not expressly prohibit marriage of a man to his
mother or of children to grandparents.
15. The criminal incest statute prohibits carnal intercourse between
grandparents and grandchild; parent and child or stepchild or
legally adopted child, or brother or sister of the half or whole blood.
16. Law prohibits marriage between "double first cousins."
17. Law permits marriage among Jews within degrees of affinity and
consanguinity allowed by their religion.
18. Law prohibits marriage between persons related to each other with-
in and not including the 5th degree of consanguinity computed ac-
cording to the rules of civil law.
19. Permits marriage between first cousins where the female has attained
the age of 55 years.
NOTES TO AFFINITY CHART (APPENDIX B)
1. In these states and situations the wife with whom marriage is pro-
hibited is described as "widow."
2. Law permits marriage among Jews within degrees of affinity or
consanguinity allowed by their religion.
3. Marriage with the lineal descendant of a spouse and with the spouse
of any lineal descendant is prohibited.
4. Include spouse's stepchild.
APPENDIX C
COMPILATION OF STATE STATUTES PROHIBITING THE MARRIAGE OF PERSONS
RELATED BY AFFINITY
Twenty states and the District of Columbia provide by statute re-
strictions making affinity a barrier to marriage between persons so re-
lated. The text of the statutes and citations are presented below.
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AlA. CODE tit. 34, § 1 (1958).
Incestuous marriages forbidden. The son must not marry his mother
or stepmother, or the sister of his father or mother. The brother must
not marry his sister or half sister, or the daughter of his brother or half
brother, or of his sister or half sister. The father must not marry his
daughter or granddaughter, or the widow of his son. No man shall marry
the daughter of his wife, or the daughter of the son or daughter of his
wife; and all such marriages are hereby declared incestuous.
All attempted marriages heretofore entered into by and between a
man and the widow of his uncle where the parties are now living to-
gether as husband and wife are hereby validated.
CONN. GE. STAT. REV. § 46-1 (1958).
Kindred who shall not marry. No man shall marry his mother,
grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, sister, aunt, niece, stepmother or
stepdaughter, and no woman shall marry her father, grandfather, son,
grandson, brother, uncle, nephew, stepfather or stepson; and, if any man
or woman marries within the degrees aforesaid, such marriage shall be
void.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-101 (1967).
The following marriages are prohibited in the District of Columbia
and shall be absolutely void ab initio, without being so decreed, and their
nullity may be shown in any collateral proceedings, namely:
First. The marriage of a man with his grandmother, grandfather's
wife, wife's grandmother, father's sister, mother's sister, mother, step-
mother, wife's mother, daughter, wife's daughter, son's wife, sister, son's
daughter, daughter's daughter, son's son's wife, daughter's son's wife,
wife's son's daughter, wife's daughter's daughter, brother's daughter, sis-
ter's daughter.
Second. The marriage of a woman with her grandfather, grand-
mother's husband, husband's grandfather, father's brother, mother's
brother, father, stepfather, husband's father, son, husband's son, daugh-
ter's husband, brother, son's son, daughter's son, son's daughter's husband,
daughter's daughter's husband, husband's son's son, husband's daughter's
son, brother's son, sister's son.
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-105 (1961).
Degrees of relationship within which marriage prohibited. Mar-
riages between persons related by affinity in the following manner are
prohibited, viz.: A man shall not marry his stepmother, or mother-in-law,
or daughter-in-law, or stepdaughter, or grand-daughter of his wife. A
woman shall not marry her corresponding relatives. Marriages within the
Levitical degrees of consanguinity shall be void. Marriages within the
degrees prohibited by this section shall be incestuous.
IowA CODE § 595.19 (1946).
Void marriages. Marriages between the following persons shall be
void:
1. Between a man and his father's sister, mother's sister, father's
widow, wife's mother's daughter, wife's daughter, son's widow, sister, son's
daughter, daughter's daughter, son's son's widow, daughter's son's widow,
brother's daughter, or sister's daughter.
2. Between a woman and her father's brother, mother's brother,
mother's husband, husband's father, son, husband's son, daughter's hus-
band, brother, son's son, daughter's son, son's daughter's husband, daugh-
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ter's daughter's husband, brother's son, or sister's son.
3. Between first cousins.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 31 (1964).
Marriages prohibited within certain degrees. No man shall marry
his mother, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, stepmother, grand.
father's wife, son's wife, grandson's wife, wife's mother, wife's grand-
mother, wife's daughter, wife's granddaughter, sister, brother's daughter,
sister's daughter, father's sister or mother's sister. No woman shall marry
her father, grandfather, son, grandson, stepfather, grandmother's Is-
band, daughter's husband, granddaughter's husband, husband's father,
husband's grandfather, husband's son, husband's grandson, brother,
brother's son, sister's son, father's brother or mother's brother.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 62, §§ 1-3 (1957).
Within what degrees of kindred or affinity marriages to be void.
If any person within this State shall marry within any of the degrees of
kindred or affinity expressed in the following table, the marriage shall
be void.














His son's son's wife,
His daughter's son's wife,
His wife's son's daughter,
His wife's daughter's daughter,
His brother's daughter,
His sister's daughter.

















Her son's daughter's husband,
Her daughter's daughter's husband,
Her husband's son's son,
Her husband's daughter's son,
Her brother's son,
Her sister's son.
Marriages between man and niece and woman and nephew prior to
1860. All marriages made and celebrated in or out of this State prior to
March 9, 1860, by and between persons related within the following de-
grees of affinity, to wit: A man and his niece, or a woman and her
nephew, are hereby confirmed and made valid to every intent and pur-
pose from the time of the celebration of such marriages, respectively;
and every such marriage shall be held and taken by all courts of this
State to be good and sufficient in law to all intents and purposes.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 207, §§ 1, 2 (1955).
Marriage of man to certain relatives. No man shall marry his mother,
grandmother, daughter, grand-daughter, sister, stepmother, grandfather's
wife, son's wife, grandson's wife, wife's mother, wife's grandmother, wife's
daughter, wife's granddaughter, brother's daughter, sister's daughter,
father's sister or mother's sister.
No woman shall marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson, broth-
er, stepfather, grandmother's husband, daughter's husband, grand-daugh-
ter's husband, husband's father, husband's grandfather, husbands son,
husband's grandson, brother's son, sister's son, father's brother or moth-
er's brother.
MicH. Corip. LAws §§ 25.3-A (1948).
Persons a man cannot marry. No man shall marry his mother, grand-
mother, daughter, grand-daughter, stepmother, grandfather's wife, son's
wife, grandson's wife, wife's mother, wife's grandmother, wife's daughter,
wife's granddaughter, nor his sister, brother's daughter, sister's daughter,
father's sister, or mother's sister, or cousin of the first [lst] degree.
Persons a woman cannot marry. No woman shall marry her father,
grandfather, son, grandson, stepfather, grandmother's husband, daugh-
ter's husband, granddaughter's husband, husband's father, husband's
grandfather, husband's son, husband's grandson, nor her brother, broth-
er's son, sister's son, father's brother, mother's brother, or cousin of the
first [1st] degree.
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 457-58 (1956).
Unlawful marriages-persons shall not marry within the following
degrees. The son shall not marry his grandmother, his mother, or his
stepmother; the brother his sister; the father his daughter, or his legally
adopted daughter, or his granddaughter; the son shall not marry the
daughter of his father begotten of his stepmother, or his aunt, being his
father's or mother's sister, nor shall the children of brother or sister, or
brothers and sisters intermarry being first cousins by blood.
Unlawful marriages-what marriages are incestuous. The father shall
not marry his son's widow; a man shall not marry his wife's daughter, or
his wife's daughter's daughter, or his wife's son's daughter, or the daugh-
ter of his brother or sister; and the like prohibition shall extend to fe-
males in the same degrees; and all marriages prohibited by this and the
preceding section are incestuous and void.
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N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1-57:2 (1955).
Degrees Prohibited, Men. No man shall marry his father's sister,
mother's sister, father's widow, wife's mother, daughter, wife's daughter,
son's widow, sister, son's daughter, daughter's daughter, son's son's widow,
daughter's son's widow, brother's daughter, or sister's daughter, father's
brother's daughter, mother's brother's daughter, father's sister's daughter
or mother's sister's daughter.
Degrees Prohibited, Women. No woman shall marry her father, her
father's brother, mother's brother, mother's husband, husband's father,
son, husband's son, daughter's husband, brother, son's son, daughter's son,
son's daughter's husband, daughter's daughter's husband, brother's son,
sister's son, father's brother's son, mother's brother's son, father's sister's
son or mother's sister's son.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 2 (1961).
Consanguinity. Marriages between ancestors and descendants of any
degree, of a stepfather with a stepdaughter, stepmother with stepson,
between uncles and nieces, aunts and nephews, except in cases where such
relationship is only by marriage, between brothers and sisters of the half
as well as the whole blood, and first cousins, or second cousins, are de-
clared to be incestuous, illegal, and void, and are expressly prohibited.
Provided, that any marriage of first or second cousins heretofore per-
formed in another state authorizing such marriages, which is otherwise
legal, is hereby recognized as valid and binding in this state as of the
date of such marriage. I
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-5 (i) (1957).
Restrictions on the issue of marriage license. No license to marry
shall be issued by any clerk of the orphans' court:I
I (i) To applicants within the prohibited degrees of Consanguinity
and affinity, which are as follows:
Degrees of Consanguinity
A man may not marry his mother.
A man may not marry his father's sister.
A man may not marry his mother's sister.
A man may not marry his sister.
A man may not marry his daughter.
A man niay not marry the daughter of his son or daughter.
A man may not marry his first cousin.
A woman may not marry her father.
A woman may not marry her father's brother.
A woman may not marry her mother's brother.
A woman may not marry her brother.
A woman may not marry her son.
A woman may not marry the son of her son or daughter.
A woman may not marry her first cousin.
Degrees of Affinity
A man may not marry his father's wife.
A man may not marry his son's wife.
A man may not marry his wife's daughter.
A man may not marry the daughter of his wife's son or daughter.
A woman may not marry her mother's husband.
A woman may not marry her daughter's husband.
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A woman may not marry her husband's son.
A woman may not marry the son of her husband's son or daughter.
R.I. GEN. LAws AN. §§ 15-1-1, -1-2, -1-4 (1956).
Men forbidden to marry kindred.-No man shall marry his mother,
grandmother, daughter, son's daughter, daughter's daughter, stepmoth.
er, grandfather's wife, son's wife, son's son's wife, daughter's son's wife,
wife's mother, wife's grandmother, wife's daughter, wife's son's daugh-
ter, wife's daughter's daughter, sister, brothers' daughter, sister's daugh-
ter, father's sister, mother's sister.
Women forbidden to marry kindred-No woman shall marry her
father, grandfather, son, son's son, daughter's son, stepfather, grandmoth-
er's husband, daughter's husband, son's daughter's husband, daughter's
daughter's husband, husband's father, husband's grandfather, husband's
son, husband's son's son, husband's daughter's son, brother, brother's
son, sister's father's brother, and mother's brother.
Marriages of kindred allowed by Jewish religion.-The provisions of
§§15-1-1 to 15-1-3, inclusive, shall not extend to, or in any way affect,
any marriage which shall be solemnized among the Jews, within the de-
grees of affinity or consanguinity allowed by their religion.
S. C. CODE ANN. §20-1 (1962).
Who may contract matrimony.-All persons, except mentally incom-
petent persons, and persons whose marriage is prohibited by this section,
may lawfully contract matrimony.
No man shall marry his mother, grandmother, daughter, grand-
daughter, stepmother, sister, grandfather's wife, son's wife, grandson's
wife, wife's mother, wife's grandmother, wife's daughter, wife's grand-
daughter, brother's daughter, sister's daughter, father's sister or mother's
sister.
No woman shall marry her father, grandfather, son, grandson, step-
father, brother, grandmother's husband, daughter's husband, granddaugh-
ter's husband, husband's father, husband's grandfather, husband's son,
husband's grandson, brother's son, sister's son, father's brother or moth-
er's brother. (1952 CODE § 20-1; 1942 CODE § 8556; 1932 CODE § 8556).
S. D. CODE § 14.0106 (1939).
Void marriages: incestuous relations; parental relationships; mixed
race marriages; null and void from beginning. The following marriages
are null and void from the beginning:
(1) Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descend-
ants of every degree, and between brothers and sisters of the
half as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces,
or aunts and nephews, and between cousins of the half as well
as the whole blood, whether the relationship is legitimate or
illegitimate;
(2) Every marriage of a stepfather with a stepdaughter or a step-
mother with a stepson;
TrNN. CODE ANN. § 39-705 (1956).
Incest - Penalty.-No man shall marry or have carnal knowledge of
his mother, his father's sister, his mother's sister, his sister, his daughter,
the daughter of his brother or sister, the daughter of his son or daughter,
his father's wife, his son's wife, his wife's daughter, the daughter of his
wife's son or daughter. No woman shall marry or have sexual intercourse
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with her father, her father's brother, her mother's brother, her brother,
her son, the son of her brother or sister, the son of her son or daughter,
her mother's husband, her daughter's husband, her husband's son, the
son of her husband's son or daughter.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-401 (1956).
Prohibited degrees of relationship.-Marriage cannot be contracted
with a lineal ancestor or descendant, nor the lineal ancestor or descendant
of either parents, nor the child of a grandparents, nor the lineal descend-
ants of husband or wife, as the case may be, nor the husband or wife of
a parent, or lineal descendant.
TEx. PEN. CODE art. 496, 497 (1948).
Who men cannot marry.-No man shall marry his mother, his fa-
ther's sister or half-sister, his mother's sister or half-sister, his daughter,
the daughter of his father, mother, brother or sister or if his half-
brother or sister, the daughter'of his son or daughter, his father's widow,
his son's widow, his wife's daughter or the daughter of his wife's son or
daughter..
Who women cannot marry. No woman shall marry her father, her
father's brother or half-brother, her mother's brother or half-brother, her
own brother or half-brother, her son, the son of her brother or sister or
her half-brother or half-sister, the son of her son or daughter, her moth-
er's husband, her daughter's husband, her husband's son, the son of her
husband's son or daughter.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1, 2 (1959).
Man forbidden to marry relatives. A man shall not marry his moth-
er, grandmother, stepmother, daughter, granddaughter, grandfather's
wife, son's wife, grandson's wife, wife's mother, wife's grandmother, wife's
daughter, wife's granddaughter, sister, brother's daughter, sister's daugh-
ter, father's sister or mother's sister.
Woman forbidden to marry relatives. A woman shall not marry her
father, grandfather, son, grandson, stepfather, grandmother's husband,
daughter's husband, granddaughter's husband, husband's father, hus.
band's grandfather, husband's son, husband's grandson, brother, brother's
son, sister's son, father's brother or mother's brother.
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-38 (1950).
Marriage within certain degrees prohibited.-No man shall marry
his mother, grandmother, stepmother, sister, daughter, granddaughter,
half sister, aunt, son's widow, wife's daughter or her granddaughter or
stepdaughter, daughter, or sister's daughter. If any man has prior to June
fifteenth, nineteen hundred and ten, married his brother's widow or the
widow of his brother's or sister's son or his uncle's widow, or his son's
widow or stepdaughter, such marriage is hereby declared to be legal and
valid and exempt from the penalties prescribed by existing laws. No
woman shall marry her father, grandfather, stepfather, brother, son,
grandson, half brother, uncle, daughter's husband, husband's son or his
grandson or stepson, brother's son, sister's son, or husband of her broth-
er's or sister's daughter.
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-2, 1-3 (1966).
What relatives a man may not marry; validation of certain mar-
riages. No man shall marry his mother, grandmother, stepmother, sister,
daughter, granddaughter, half sister, aunt, son's wife; wife's daughter,
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or her granddaughter or stepdaughter, brother's daughter, sister's daugh-
ter, first cousin, double cousin, or wife of his brother's or sister's son.
If any many has heretofore married his brother's widow, uncle's widow,
first cousin or double cousin, such marriage is hereby declared to be
legal and valid and exempt from penalties prescribed by former laws.
What relatives a woman may not marry. No woman shall marry her
father, grandfather, stepfather, brother, son, grandson, half brother,
uncle, daughter's husband, husband's son, or his grandson or stepson,
brother's son, sister's son, first cousin, double cousin or husband of her
brother's or sister's daughter.
APPENDIX D
COAVILATION OF STATUTES INTOSING IMPEDIMENTS TO MARRIAGE BASED ON
CAPAcnY OF T PARTIES
At least 35 states and Puerto Rico provide by statute impediments
to marriage based on insanity, feeble-mindedness and related disabilities.
The text of the statutes and citations are set forth below:
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.150 (1962).
Issuance of license. A marriage license may not be issued unless both
of the contracting parties are identified to the satisfaction of the proper
-licensing officer ... If there is no legal objection to the marriage and
neither party is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or otherwise
incapable of understanding the seriousness of the proceeding, the licens-
ing officer shall issue a license.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 69 (West Supp. 1963).
License; necessity; contents; denial; under age applicants; forms.
No license must be granted when either of the parties, applicants there-
for, is an imbecile, or insane, or is at the time of making the application,
for said license, under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, or nar-
cotic drug.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 101 (b) (1) to (b) (7), 101 (c) (1953).
(b) A marriage is prohibited, and is void from the time its nullity
is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction at the instance of the in-
nocent party, if either party thereto is-
(1) A person of any degree of unsoundness of mind; (Supp.
1966).
(2) A patient, or has been, in an insane asylum, unless such
person first files with the Clerk of the Peace to whom he makes ap-
plication for a marriage license, a certificate signed by the superin-
tendent of the asylum in which such person is or was a patient,
stating that such person is fit to marry, and unless such person in
other respects may lawfully marry;
(3) Venereally diseased, or is suffering from any other com-
municable disease, the nature of which is unknowm to the other
party of the proposed marriage;
(4) An habitual drunkard;
(5) A confirmed user of a narcotic drug;
(6) Divorced, unless a certified copy of the divorce decree
(last decree if he has been divorced more than once), or a certificate
of such divorce from the clerk at the court granting the divorce is
inspected by the Clerk of the Peace to whom he makes application
for a marriage license, and unless such person may in other respects
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lawfully marry; and if each decree or certificate cannot be obtained,
the Resident Judge at the county where such certificates as may be
accepted under the provisions of this sub-division, may grant a cer-
tificate of the facts as stated by, the applicant and the certificate may,
for the purposes of this chapter, be accepted in lieu of a certified
copy of a divorce decree; (Supp. 1966).
(7) On probation or parole from any court or institution,
unless such person first files, with the Clerk of the Peace to whom
he makes application for a marriage license, a written consent to his
proposed marriage from the chief officer of such court or institution,
or from someone who is appointed by such officer to give such con-
sent, and unless in other respects the applicant may lawfully marry.
(c) A marriage between paupers is prohibited, and is void from
the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction at
the instance of the innocent party.
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-102 (1961).
Persons able to contract. To be able to contract marriage, a person
must be of sound mind; if a male, at least 17 years of age, and if a fe-
male, at least 14 years, ....
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89 § 6 (1965).
License - Affidavit - Penalty. All persons about to be joined in
marriage must first obtain a license therefor, from the County Clerk of
the County in which such marriage is to take place, anything in any
general or special law of this State to the contrary notwithstanding, which
license must show:
1. Their real and full names, and places of residence.
2. Their ages.
No license may be granted when either of the parties, applicants
therefor, is an imbecile, or insane, or is at the time of making the appli-
cation, or proofs herein required, for said license under the influence of
any intoxicating liquor, or narcotic drug...
IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-104 (1965).
Void marriages. The following marriages are declared void:
Second. When either party is insane or idiotic, at the time of such
marriage.'
IOWA CODE § 595.3 (Supp. 1966).
License. Previous to the solemnization of any marriage, a license for
that purpose must be obtained from the clerk of the district court of the
county wherein the marriage is to be solemnized. Such license must not
be granted in any case: 5. Where either party is mentally ill or retarded,
a mental retardate, or under guardianship as an incompetent.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-120 (Supp. 1967).
Marriage of adjudicated incapacitated persons. No woman under
the age of forty-five (45) years, or many of any age, except he marry a
woman over the age of forty-five (45) years, either of whom is an ad-judged incapacitated person shall hereafter intermarry or marry any other
person within this State as long as the such person has not been restored
to capacity.
Ky. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (1963).
Other prohibited marriages. Marriage is prohibited and void: (1)
With an idiot or lunatic.
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ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 32 (1964).
Persons under disability. No mentally ill or feeble-minded person
or idiot is capable of contracting marriage.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. Ch. 207, § 5 (1955).
Insane, etc. Persons incapable of marrying. An insane person; an
idiot, or a feeble-minded person under commitment to an institution
for the feeble-minded, to the custody or supervision of the department
of mental health, or to an institution for mental defectives, shall be in-
capable of contracting marriage. The validity of a marriage shall not be
questioned by reason of the insanity, idiocy or of the feeble-mindedness
aforesaid of either party in the trial of a collateral issue, but shall be
raised only in a process instituted in the lifetime of both parties to test
such validity.
MicH. Comp. LAWS § 25.6 (Supp. 1968).
Marriage; incapacity; venereal disease; legalization of white-African
marriages; penalty for marriage of person afflicted with venereal disease;
competency of witness; mentally unsound person, certificate, penalty for
marriage. Sec. 6. No insane person, idiot, or person who has been af-
flicted with syphilis or gonorrhea and has not been cured of the same,
shall be capable of contracting marriage. All marriages heretofore con-
tracted between white persons and those wholly or in part of African
descent are hereby declared valid and effectual in law for all purposes;
and the issue of such marriages shall be deemed and taken as legitimate
as to such issue and as to both of the parents. Any person who has been
afflicted with syphilis or gonorrhea and has not been cured of same, who
shall marry [is] guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof in any
court of competent jurisdiction, shall be punished by a fine of not less
than S500.00 nor more than $1,000.00, or by imprisonment in the State
prison not more than 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
In all prosecutions under this act a husband shall be examined as a wit-
ness against his wife and a wife shall be examined as a witness against
her husband whether such husband or wife consent or not. In all cases
arising under this act any physician who has attended or prescribed for
any husband or wife for either of the diseases above mentioned shall be
compelled to testify to any facts found by him from such attendance.
No person who has been confined in any public institution or asylum as[a] feeble-minded, imbecile or insane patient, or who has been adjudged
insane, feeble-minded or an imbecile by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion shall be capable of contracting marriage without, before the issu-
ance by the county clerk of the license to marry, filing in the office of
the county clerk a verified statement from 2 regularly licensed physicians
of this State that such person has been completely cured of such insanity,
imbecility or feeble-mindedness and that there is no probability that
such person will transmit any of such defects or disabilities to the issue
of such marriage. Any person of sound mind who shall intermarry with
such insane person or idiot or person who has been so confined as [a]
feeble-minded, imbecile or insane patient, or who has been so adjudged
insane, feeble-minded or an imbecile, except upon the filing of certificate
as herein provided, with knowledge of the disability of such person, or
who shall advise, aid, abet, cause, procure or assist in procuring any such
marriage contrary to the provisions of this section [is] guilty of a felony
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and on conviction thereof in any court ot coiipetent jurisdiction shall
be punished by a fine of'not more, than S1,000' or-by imprisonment in the
State prison not less than 1 year nor more than 5 years, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.
MINN. STAT. § 51-7.08 (Supp. 1967)
Marriages prohibited. No marriage shall be contracted while either
of the parties has a husband or wife living; nor within six months after
either has been divorced from a former spouse; excepting re-intermar-
nage between such parties; nor within six months after either was a party
to a marriage which has been adjudged a nullity, excepting intermarriage
between such parties; nor between parties who are nearer than second
cousins; whether of the half or whole blood, computed by the rules of
the civil law; nor between persons either one of whom is imbecile, feeble-
minded, or insane; nor between persons one of whom is a male person
under 18 years of age or one of whom, is a female person under the age
of 16 years; provided, however, that mentally deficient persons committed
to the guardianship of the commissioner of public welfare may marry on
receipt of written consent of the commissioner. The commissioner may
grant such consent if it appears from his investigation that such marriage
is for the best interest of the ward and the public. The clerk of the dis.
trict court in the county where the application for a license is made by
such ward shall not issue the license unless and until he has received a
signed copy of the consent of the commissioner of public welfare.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 461 (Supp. 1966)
Conditions precedent to issuance of license. It shall be unlawful for
the circuit court clerk to issue a marriage license until the following con-
ditions precedent have been complied with:
(f) In no event shall a license be issued by the circuit court
clerk when it appears to the circuit court clerk that the applicants are,
or either of them, is drunk, insane or an imbecile.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.020 (Supp. 1967)
Certain marriages prohibited-official issuing licenses to certain per-
sons guilty of misdemeanor. All marriages between parents and children,
including grandparents and grandchildren of every degree, between
brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, between uncles
and meces, aunts and nephews, first cousins, white persons and Negroes
or white persons and Mongolians, and between persons either of whom
is insane, mentally imbecile or feeble-minded, are prohibited and declared
absolutely void; and it shall be unlawful for any city, county, or state
official having authority to issue marriage licenses to issue such marriage
licenses to the persons heretofore designated, and any such official who
shall issue such licenses to the persons aforesaid knowing such persons
to be within the prohibition of the section shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor; and this prohibition shall apply to persons born out of
lawful wedlock as well as those in lawful wedlock.
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 48-105 (1947)
Incompetency of parties to: Marriages between parents and children,
ancestors and descendants of every degree, and between brothers and sis-
ters of the half as well as the whole blood, and between nieces and
uncles, and between aunts and. nephews, and between first cousins, and
between persons, either of whom is feeble-minded, are incestuous and
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void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or il-
legitimate.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 1-102,-03 (Supp. 1965).
Marriages: when void. Marriages are void (1) when either party has a
husband or wife living at the time of the marriage; (2) when either party
is insane or an idiot at the time of marriage, and the term idiot shall
include all persons who from whatever cause are mentally incompetent
to enter into tle marriage relation; and (3) when the parties stand in
relation to each other of parents and children, grandparents and grand-
children, brother and sister of half as well as whole blood, first cousins
when of whole blood; uncle and niece, aunt and nephew; and this sub-
division extends to illegitimate as well as legitimate children and rela-
tives.
Parties; minimum age; exception; disqualifications. At the time of
the marriage the male must be of the age of eighteen years or upward,
and' the female of the age of sixteen years or upward except etc. No
person who is afflicted with a venereal disease shall marry in this State.
No person who has been adjudged an imbecile, or a feebleminded per-
son, or a person who is or has been adjudged afflicted with hereditary
epilepsy or hereditary insanity shall marry in this State, until after he
or she has submitted to an operation for sterilization.
N. H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 457:10 (Supp. 1965).
Marriage Prohibited. No woman under the age of forty-five years,
or man of any age-except he marry a woman over the age of forty-five
years,-either of whom is imbecile, feeble-minded, idiotic or insane, shall
hereafter intermarry or marry any other person within this State unless
permitted by the State Department of Health.
N.J. RFV. STAT. § 37:1-9 (Supp. 1967).
When issuance of license prohibited. No marriage license shall be
issued when either of the contracting parties, at the time of making ap-
plication therefor, is infected with gonorrhea, syphilis or chancroid in a
communicable stage, is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a
narcotic drug, or is an imbecile or of an unsound mind. Nor shall any
such license be issued to a person who is or has been an inmate of an
insane asylum or institution for indigent persons, unless it appears that
such person has been satisfactorily discharged therefrom.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (Supp. 1967).
Want of capacity; void and voidable marriages. All marriages be-
tween ... persons either of whom is at the time physically impotent, or
is incapable of contracting from want of will or understanding, shall be
void.
N.C. GFN. STAT. § 51-9 (Supp. 1967).
Health certificates required of applicants for licenses. . . And,
furthermore, such certificate shall state that, by the usual methods of ex-
amination made by a regularly licensed physician, the applicant was
found to be mentally competent. [1967 Amendment removed epilepsy
as an impediment to marriage.]
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-12 (Supp. 1967).
Eugenic sterilization for persons adjudged of unsound mind, etc. If
either applicant has been adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction
as being an idiot, imbecile, mental defective, or of unsound mind, unless
the applicant previously adjudged of unsound mind has been adjudged
1969] _'
394 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
of sound mind by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon the recom-
mendation of one or more practicing physicians who specialize in psy.
chiatry, license to marry shall be granted only after eugenic sterilization
has been performed on the applicant in accordance with State laws gov-
erning eugenic sterilization.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-07 (Supp. 1967).
Marriages prohibited. Marriage by a woman under the age of forty-
five years or by a man of any age, unless he marries a woman over the
age of forty-five years, is prohibited if such a man or woman is a chronic
alcoholic, an habitual criminal, a mentally deficient person, an insane
person, a person who has been afflicted with hereditary insanity, or with
any contagious venereal disease.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.06 (Page 1953).
Denial of license. No marriage license shall be granted when either
of the applicants is a habitual drunkard, imbecile, or insane person, is
under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or narcotic drug, or is in-
fected with syphilis in a form that is communicable or likely to become
communicable.
ORE. REv. STAT. § 106.071 (1953).
Mental and physical prerequisites to marriage license. (1) Before
any county clerk issues a marriage license, each applicant therefore shall
file with the clerk a medical certificate for marriage license signed by a
physician licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners, except that
for an applicant on active duty with the Armed Forces of the United
States, the certificate may be signed by a commissioned medical officer
of the Armed Forces or Public Health Service of the United States. In
the certificate the physician shall certify that:
(b) In the opinion of the physician, the applicant . . . is free
from other communicable venereal diseases, feeble-mindedness,
mental illness, drug addiction or chronic alcoholism.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit 48, § 1-5 (d)(e) (Supp. 1967).
Restrictions on the issue of marriage license. No license to marry
shall be issued by any clerk of the orphans' court:(d) If either of the applicants for a license is weakminded, in-
sane, of unsound mind, or is under guardianship as a person of un-
sound mind unless a judge of the orphans' court shall decide that
it is for the best interest of such applicant and the general public
to issue the license, and shall authorize the clerk of the orphans'
court to issue the license.
(c) If either of the applicants is or has been, within five years
preceding the time of the application, an inmate of an institution
for weakminded, insane, or persons of unsound mind, unless a judge
of the orphan's court shall decide that it is for the best interest of
such applicant and the general public to issue the license, and shall
authorize the clerk of the orphans' court to issue the license.
P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 31, § 235 (1955).
The marriage of any person suffering from insanity, idiocy, syphilis,
or from any venereal disease, is hereby prohibited while the disease sub-
sists; and if such marriage is contracted, it may be annulled by the part
of the Superior Court of the residence of either of the parties thereto, on
petition of the prosecuting attorney of the Superior Court or of an in-
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terested party with the intervention of the prosecuting attorney of he
part of the Superior Court where the act is filed; provided, that the ac-
tion for nullity cannot be exercised when the case of nullity has dis-
appeared at the time of the action is instituted.
The action for nullity cannot be exercised during the pregnancy of
the wife. When a marriage is declared void by virtue of the provisions
of the law, the children begotten therein shall be legitimate children.
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-1-5 (1956).
Bigamous marriages void-Marriage of lunatics and idiots. Any mar-
riage... where either of the parties thereto shall be an idiot or a luna-
tic at the time of such marriage, shall be absolutely void, and no dower
shall be assigned to any widow in consequence of such marriage, and the
issue of such marriage shall be deemed illegitimate and subject to all
the disabilities of such issue.
S.C. Code Ann. §20-1 (1962)
Who may contract matrimony.-All persons, except mentally incoin-
petent persons, . . . may lawfully contract matrimony ...
S.D. CoDE § 80.0412 (1939).
List of feeble-minded maintained at marriage license agencies: duty
of State Commission; duties of clerk of courts, secrecy of list. The State
Commission shall fie with the clerk of courts of each county and with
any other marriage license issuing agency now or hereafter provided in
any county of the State, a complete list of all persons found by the sub-
commissions of the various counties to be feeble-minded and resident
within the State; which list shall be revised and supplemented from time
to time by the State Commission; and it shall be the duty of such clerk
of courts, or any others who may legally issue a marriage license, to re-
vise and supplement their list to accord with such revised or supple-
mented list as submitted by the State Commission. The clerk of courts
shall check all death certificates appearing in his office against all lists
submitted by the State Commission to ascertain if such death was that
of any person whose name appears upon said lists. If any such death is
found to be that of a person whose name is upon such lists, the clerk
of courts shall thereupon remove such name from said lists and shall
immediately notify the chairman of the State Commission of the death
of such party. It shall be unlawful for the clerk of courts or any marriage
license issuing agency to allow publication of any such lists submitted
by the State Commission.
S.D. CODE § 30.0413 (1939).
Marriage license to feeble-minded prohibited: exception persons in-
capable reproduction; determination of identity persons with same name
as feeble-minded; appeals to Circuit Courts. It shall be unlawful for any
clerk of courts or any marriage license issuing agency now existing or
hereafter created within the State of South Dakota, to issue a marriage
license if the name of either of the contracting parties to a proposed mar-
riage appears upon any of the lists submitted by the State Commission;
however, in cases where either of the contracting parties has the same
name as one appearing upon such lists but of a different identity, a
license shall be issued upon the submission to the clerk of courts and to
the State Commission of satisfactory evidence of such identity, or upon
submission to the State Commission of evidence satisfactory to said State
Commission that either of said contracting parties has been rendered
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sterile by an operation for sterilization or is otherwise incapable of pro,
creation.
The party-to whom such license is refused may appeal to the Circuit
Court of the county in which such license is refused. Such appeal may
be perfected by the service of the notice of appeal on said clerk of courts
and by filing the same in the office of the clerk of courts, within thirty
days after refusal to issue said license.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-411 (1956).
Issuance of license to drunks, insane persons or imbeciles forbidden.
No license shall be issued when, it appears that the applicants or either
of them is at the time drunk, insane or an imbecile.
UTAK CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (Supp. 1965).
Marriages prohibited and void. The following marriages are pro.
hibited and declared void:
(1) With an idiot or lunatic, with a person afflicted with
syphilis or gonorrhea that is communicable or that may become
communicable.
UTA- CODE ANN. § 30-1-2.1 (Supp. 1967).
Validation of marriage to a person subject to chronic epileptic fits
who had not been sterilized.-All marriages, otherwise valid and legal,
contracted prior to the effective date of this act, to which either party
Was subject to chronic epileptic fits and who had not been sterilized, as
provided by law, are hereby validated and legalized in all respects as
though such marriages had been duly and legally contracted in the first
instance.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5142 (1959).
-estrictions as to minors, incompetent persons, and paupers. A clerk
shall. not. issue a marriage license when either party to the intended
marriage is: ...
(3) Nor when eitherof the parties to the intended marriage is
non compos mentis;
(4) Nor to a person under guardianship without the written con-
sent of such guardian;
(5) Nor in case of a town pauper without the written consent of
the selectment or overseer of the poor of each of the towns where the
parties reside, or which are liable for their support, and such written
consent shall be attached to the original license; ...
VA. CODE: ANN. § 20-46 (1960).
Marriage of habitual criminals, insane persons, and mental defec.
tives. (1) Definitions.-The term "habitual criminal" as used in this sec-
tion shall be construed to mean anyone who has been convicted at least
three times of felonious crimes, and the term "hereditary epileptic" shall
be construed to mean epileptic either of whose parents is or has been
an epileptic.
(2) Habitual criminals and mental defectives.-No woman under
the age of forty-five years, and no man of any age, unless lie marry a
woman over the age of forty-five years, either of whom is an habitual
criminal, idiot, imbecile, hereditary epileptic or insane person, shall here.
after intermarry or marry any other person within this State.
(3) Clergymen not to solemnize such marriages.-No clergyman
or other officer authorized by law to solemnize marriages within this
State, shall hereafter knowingly perform a marriage ceremony uniting
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persons in matrimony, either of whom is an habitual criminal, idiot,
imbecile, hereditary epileptic, or insane person, unless it be that the
female party to such a marriage is over the age of forty-five years.
(4) Clerks not to issue license to such persons; evidence to deter-
mine disability; certificate of capability to marry-No clerk of court,
whose business it is to issue marriage licenses, shall knowingly issue a
license to any applicants either of whom is an habitual criminal, idiot,
imbecile, hereditary epileptic, or insane person, unless it be that the fe-
male applicant is over the age of forty-five years. The clerk, in the event
he is not satisfied as to whether one or both of the parties is or are an
idiot, feeble-minded person, imbecile, hereditary epileptic or insane per-
son, shall be authorized to follow the recommendation of the chairman
of the board of health of his county or city or some duly authorized
practicing physician in the county or city of his selection, and for which
examination and report a fee not exceeding two dollars and a half may
be charged, to be paid by the party or parties applying for the license,
to be paid to the physician making the report and recommendation.
In the event any person applying for such license shall present to
the clerk a certificate dated within the preceding thirty days from a qual-
ified physician or superintendent of any mental institution showing that
such physician or from an institution for the care and treatment of the
mentally ill or mentally deficient, or has improved and in the judgment
of such physician or superintendent, is not an idiot, imbecile, hereditary
epileptic or insane person and is capable of entering into the marriage
relationship, the clerk may issue such license, and be discharged of any
liability under the provisions of this section.... (Supp. 1967).
VA. CODE ArNN. § 20-47 (Supp. 1966).
Marriage of persons adjudged insane or feeble-minded and admitted
to State institutions.-If any man or woman shall knowingly marry any
person lawfully adjudged to be insane or feeble-minded, as provided in
chapter 5 (§37-136 et seq.) of Title 37, and duly admitted as a patient
or inmate in any State hospital or colony for the mentally ill or mentally
deficient, whether such person be actually confined in a hospital or col-
ony or in the custody of some person on bond or furlough or at large as
an escaped patient or inmate, he or she shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and on conviction thereof shall be confined in jail not exceeding six
months or fined not exceeding five hundred dollars or both. Furthermore,
if any persons, resident of this State, one of whom has been so adjudged
to be insane or feeble-minded and is a lawfuly committed and undis-
charged patient or inmate of any State hospital or colony for the men-
tally ill or mentally deficient, as above provided, shall, with the intention
of returning to reside in this State, go into another State or country and
there intermarry and return to and reside in this State, cohabiting as
man and -wife, such marriage shall be governed by the same law, in all
respects as if it had been solemnized in this State.
WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.04.030 (1961).
Criminality, insanity, disease. No woman under the age of forty-five
years, or man of any age, except he marry a woman over the age of forty-
five years, either of whom is a common drunkard, habitual criminal, im-
becile, feeble-minded person, idiot or insane person, or person who has
theretofore been afflicted with hereditary insanity, or who is afflicted
with pulmonary tuberculosis in its advanced stages, or any contagious
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venereal disease, shall hereafter intermarry or marry any other person
within this-State.
Wis. STAT. § 245.03 (Supp. 1967).
Who shall not marry; divorced persons . .. A marriage may not be
contracted if either party has such want of understanding as renders him
incapable of assenting to marriage, whether by reason of insanity, idiocy
or other causes.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-32 (1957).
. Void marriages defined.-Marriages are void without any decree of
divorce that may hereafter be contracted in this State: Second-When
either party is insane or an idiot at the time of contracting the marriage.
